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I. Current Administrative Scenario: 
The Banco Nacional de Costa Rica reflects a broad range of 
operational characteristics, that grows out of its long history 
of branch banking, its traditional role as the major supplier of 
small farmer credit in the country, and its bureaucratic style of 
centralized decision-making. Its overwhelming dominance in Costa 
Rica's financial markets and the lack of effective competition 
(until recently) have heavily influenced its legacy of excessive 
documentation. This legacy also consists of little consideration 
of risk in the management of its portfolio and the bank's readily 
accepted role as the government's main channel for development 
finance (especially in agriculture). In this setting, it is not 
surprising to note that the administrative procedures of loan 
evaluation, loan monitoring, and loan recovery carry a degree of 
documentation and supervision that adds substantially to bank 
costs. 
To investigate these costs, visits were made to three 
branches (Turrialba, Guacimo, and Orotina) and extensive inter-
views were undertaken of officials in the Departamento de Credito 
Rural, in Estudios Econ6micos, and the office coordinating donor 
funds (UNDICO). The results of these interviews, concerning the 
administrative procedures of dealing with the loan portfolio, can 
be summarized as follows: 
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1. Procedure: There is an extensive amount of paper-
work associated with the loan applications, from 6 to 20 separate 
forms for standard short-term loans in the Juntas Rurales 
(depending upon enterprise type), and as much as 25 pages and 7 
to 8 detailed tables for BID loans, administered through UNDICO 
(Unidad De Direcci6n y Coordinaci6n) , the unit of the Banco 
Nacional that handles donor funding for agricultural investment 
loans. The paperwork (from application to disbursement) for 
short-term loans takes 3 to 4 weeks, while for long-term invest-
ment loans through the BID program it can take from 6 to 8 weeks. 
2. Borrower Eligibility: Among other things, this 
documentation is concerned with determining whether a farmer 
qualifies for a subsidized small farmer loan, at a 15 percent 
interest rate in the Junta Rural, or is only able to take out a 
commercial loan, at current market interest rates (around 22 or 
23 percent). Up to early 1988, the eligibility threshold for the 
Junta Rural portfolio has been a gross income of 800,000 colones. 
Some delegados in the branch offices apparently feel they have 
been able to estimate this threshold with knowledge about the 
farm acreage, what crops are grown, and the ruling market prices 
(they ignore non-farm or off-farm income sources for the family). 
Other delegados have used the amount of accumulated outstanding 
debt as a proxy for determining small farmer eligibility. If 
outstanding debt fell below 800, 000 colones, the farmer qual-
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ified. No doubt, there has been an uneven application of this 
rule across the large number of branches. In early 1988, these 
gross income and debt thresholds have been raised to 900, ooo 
colones. 
3. Avios: The heavy incidence of documentation, lies in 
the use of detailed farm budget models (avios) for selected crops 
and enterprises, in order to determine the total costs of 
production of the prospective borrower. Branches are told not to 
lend more than the total costs of production estimated through 
these exercises. They are able to lend less. However, the 
maximum has in effect become the norm for a number of branches. 
In these branches, the full-cost lending practices reflect their 
tendency to treat all borrowers equally. This avoids the hassle 
of differential treatment (and the charge of favoritism) that 
could grow out of differential levels of self-finance they might 
build into the loan contracts. 
The detailed BID long-term investment loans cover only 80 
percent of the total cost of these projects. However, the 
remaining 20 percent is made up of family labor and other forms 
of farmer participation that do not require cash payments. In 
effect, this can imply that the bank engages in 100 percent of 
financing. 
This BID financing is directed towards new, non-traditional 
export crops (in contrast to the more traditional crops financed 
through the Juntas Rurales) and is generally processed initially 
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by the delegado at the branch level. 
Nacional system there is a team of 
professionals, headquartered in UNDICO. 
However, in the Banco 
roughly 50 BID-trained 
The team has 10 prof es-
sionals in the San Jose office (supported by 20 clerical staff) 
and 10 teams of roughly 4 members each, spread throughout the 
country, for field level technical assistance for the farm-
borrowers and the delegados. These teams consist of a veterinar-
ian, two agronomists, and an animal scientist. 
This team represents a substantial investment in human 
resources. To date, no cost-effective study of their activities 
has been undertaken or even proposed. BID presumably supports 50 
percent of this expensive payroll and the Banco Nacional has 
absorbed the rest. It is not clear if this gradual absorption 
will continue by the Banco Nacional or whether its relative share 
of covering these costs will remain at this present level. 
4. UNDICO: As stated above, approximately 50 profes-
sional technicians work in the BID-oriented unit of the bank, of 
which 14 were trained in foreign universities. They no doubt 
represent a valuable level of expertise, that should be able to 
make a contribution to a rise in agricultural productivity in 
selected crops and livestock activities. In many respects, the 
UNDICO unit is the spearhead of agricultural modernization in the 
Banco Nacional. The issue is whether their current use in the 
Banco is cost effective. One way to test this would be to 
investigate the agricultural portfolio of the recently created 
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private banks, which allegedly are also financing non-traditional 
agricultural exports. If their agricultural portfolios are 
roughly comparable, one could compare the relative costs per 
color lent for the BID-financed Banco Nacional clients and those 
in the private banks. 
In so doing, however, care must be taken to determine if the 
BID effort is largely directed towards bringing small farmers 
into the modern investment portfolio (with all the associated 
technical assistance needed for that effort), while the private 
banks may be only financing those who have already graduated a 
long time ago or never were traditional small farmers in the 
Costa Rican sense (i.e. such as foreign nationals operating in 
Costa Rica). In short, the BID effort in UNDICO may be assuming 
a far more challenging task of modernizing a riskier and more 
difficult subset of farmers than the private banks, thereby 
justifying a higher cost of technical assistance. 
5. Targeting: Credit guidelines have been simplified 
and partially liberalized from five years ago. Branch managers 
and delegados greatly prefer the current, more liberalized 
environment, with minimal targeting. Nevertheless, the Central 
Off ice still establishes targeted short- and long-run credit 
lines. It is not clear who is responsible for establishing these 
relative allocations and what justification or criteria is used 
to determine them. The operational criteria and arguments used 
to defend these "relative" allocations should be made more 
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explicit, while responsibility for making these decision should 
be clearly assigned. 
6. Rescheduling: The rescheduling and postponement of 
loan repayments are fairly common in the Juntas Rurales. In some 
settings they could add substantially to an upper threshold of 
arrears. Clearly, a more detailed investigation of these 
reschedulings and postponements is called for, in order to 
determine the degree of careful evaluation behind these actions 
and the degree to which they may lead to further arrears later 
on. 
7. Arrears: Striking differences exist with respect to 
the arrears rate among the branches in the Banco Nacional. It 
would be in the interest of the Bank to document these on a 
regular basis and to establish the regional, enterprise, and loan 
characteristics · associated with the differential profile of 
arrears in the network. 
For example, Palmar Norte, Carmona, Bagaces, Esparta, 
Filadelfia, Abangares, and Orotina have arrears rates over 90 
percent in their agricultural portfolios. On the other hand, 
branches such as Heredia, Turrialba, Alajuela, and San Isidro 
only record delinquency rates in the 30 percent range, while 
Grecia, Palmares, Atenas, Tarazu, and Zarcero record arrears 
around 20 percent or less. Regional, enterprise and loan 
characteristics can no doubt be established here, that could help 
-. 
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in the design of future credit strategies and in accumulating 
loan-evaluation intelligence information. 
8. The overall arrears rate for the Banco Nacional (90 
days or more) was 21 percent in 1983, 36 percent in 1985, and 37 
percent in 1987. It was the state-owned bank with the highest 
arrears rate in 1985 and there is no reason to suppose that this 
changed in 1987. Within the Bank, agriculture is a highly 
delinquent portfolio. In 1987, 43 percent of the agricultural 
portfolio was in arrears (90 days or more) as was 46 percent of 
the livestock portfolio. In contrast, the industrial portfolio 
recorded a 24 percent arrears rate and the rest of the portfolio 
together only 21 percent. Clearly, the institution is not viable 
in the conventional sense of the term. Much of its current 
portfolio is non-performing, separate from the Juntas Rurales 
small-farmer area. Indeed, there is no noticeable difference 
between the two portfolios. On the whole, the Juntas Rurales may 
be performing better than the rest of the agricultural portfolio. 
9. Rationing: The rigor and selectivity behind loan 
evaluation in the Juntas Rurales varies by branch, according to 
the background and skill of the delegado and his relative 
influence in the branch. Much rationing occurs at the "counter," 
when many prospective clients are screened out through casual 
conversation. The number of rejections within the set that fills 
out the forms is not particularly high in the branches we 
8 
visited. This seems to be the case elsewhere, as well. The 
standard time spent on processing production loans (3 to 4 weeks) 
or investment loans (7 to 8 weeks) is similar regardless of 
enterprise type. The farmer has to visit the bank a minimum of 
four times for an ordinary loan. The fiador (cosigner) has to 
visit the bank on two occasions for an ordinary loan, with the 
borrower paying for these expenses. These transactions costs 
appear to be fairly uniform, in an absolute basis, across the 
three branches we visited, but may differ in relative terms 
because of differences in loan size. 
10. Old Borrowers: Perhaps the most surprising finding 
in the field was that former borrowers in good standing still 
have to fill out the same set of forms and update and document 
their collateral all over again as if they were a new borrower. 
This can even happen to an established customer applying for two 
loans in the same year (one for planting, the other for harvest 
needs). Such undifferentiated treatment between established and 
new borrowers appears illogical and unnecessary. It clearly adds 
more lending costs to the institution than is necessary as well 
as unnecessary borrowing costs for the established borrower. 
11. Delegados: The delegado (and his two auxiliaries) 
are usually in the field four days of the week and in the off ice 
one day, usually Friday. The number of loans made in a year 
could range from 400 to 700 at a minimum, depending on the 
.. 
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availability of credit from the central office. There are a 
large number of visits in the field, numbering several thousand 
visits in a year. The auxiliaries usually engage in 15 to 20 
minute visits per farm to check on whether corn is being grown, 
etc. while the delegado spends more time (and records less 
visits), usually checking value of collateral and providing 
occasional technical assistance. The delegados we visited felt 
that a new loan portfolio much beyond 400 clientele would be 
difficult to service well. It would appear that most have been 
induced into expanding their portfolios beyond the levels they 
feel they can service adequately. 
12. Branch Managers: There are three separate organiza-
tions dealing with agricultural credit in the Banco Nacional. 
First, there are the Juntas Rurales, dealing largely with small 
farmer credit in traditional crop and livestock activities. 
Second, there is the commercial portfolio for larger operators, 
presumably more modern and with larger-sized loans at market 
rates of interest. Finally, there are the BID loans for longer-
term investments in non-traditional activities. The clientele, 
documentation, administrative procedures and reporting require-
ments are different in each case. At the same time, there have 
been mutually designed responsibilities at the branch level, with 
the delegado administering the Junta Rural (and also playing an 
important role in administering the agricultural component of the 
commercial portfolio with the branch manager). The branch 
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manager is responsible for the rest of the portfolio (i.e. the 
non-agricultural loans). The lines of authority can vary. The 
strength of the personalities, background experience, and 
relative importance of the agricultural portfolio play a role in 
determining which of the two officials dominates decision-making 
for agricultural loans at the branch level. 
13. Reorganization: An administrative reorganization is 
currently under consideration, in order to deal with the issues 
described in the previous paragraph. Ten regional offices would 
be established. Each off ice would have their own service units 
(such as BID-type technical assistance teams) to service the 
branches under their jurisdiction. 
One credit committee would operate within each region and, 
at the branch level, everyone, including the delegado, would now 
report to the branch manager. This would create a unified 
mandate and executive control at the branch level. The balance 
between consolidation (especially of service units) and decentra-
lization of decision-making (especially on loan evaluation and 
loan approval and/or rejection) is still unclear in these plans. 
There would appear to be a tendency to centralize decision making 
on the loan portfolio at levels above the branch level (i.e. in 
the ten regional officers). However, as of this writing (March 
1988), information on the plans for reorganization is still 
incomplete. Thus, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions 
on this effort • .!/ 
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II. Important Issues and Preliminary Recommendations 
Much of what follows highlights issues concerning the 
current organizational framework. In addition, some issues are 
set forth concerning the prospective reorganization plans. The 
discussion is organized into two broad areas: one dealing with 
organizational issues (and their implicit transactions cost 
dimension) and pricing issues. 
A. Organizational Issues 
1. An important issue at the branch level is the degree to 
which the current case load is too burdensome for the delegado 
and his auxiliaries. A portfolio of 400 to 800 new loans and 
several thousand farm visits per year for the team raise ques-
tions about the appropriate administrative responsibility (i.,e. 
the most cost effective case load) to achieve a reasonable level 
of loan monitoring and loan recovery. The case load for the 
delegado and his auxiliaries frequently includes the commercial 
portfolio (for agricultural loans) as well as the more numerous 
small farmer loans in the Junta Rural. There is an implicit 
trade off between level of case load and rate of arrears. It is 
not clear if this is taken into consideration in designing the 
current case loads at the branch level. Informal comments 
suggest that the ideal case load is less than the number current-
ly serviced at this level. 
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2. The issue of technical assistance is important through-
out the Banco Nacional. First what degree and level of technical 
assistance should be carried out at the branch level and what 
degree at other levels? Should the bank continue to invest in 
building up its own technical assistance capacity (such as the 
BID loan teams) or should this role be contracted out to indepen-
dent specialists in the private market, with an appropriate 
margin built into the investment loan contract to cover these 
project expenses? What is the optimal balance between these two 
possible sources of technical assistance? It would be important 
to investigate the cost effectiveness of the current technical 
assistance framework within the bank before drawing conclusions 
on this. In the meantime, the idea of consolidating the more 
intensive form of technical assistance activity into ten regional 
teams would appear to gain some valuable scale economies for the 
system. The local delegado would be performing a marginal, quick 
inspection role and call in the regional teams for more heavy 
duty technical advise. 
One 
scenario 
possible 
would be 
alternative in the technical assistance 
to let the market determine the eventual 
allocation of these functions between inside and outside sources. 
Presumably the farmer-investor could choose to budget for outside 
technical assistance in his loan contract or draw upon inside 
bank teams. If the inside assistance is offered cost free, then 
the margin for contracting outside assistance would have to be 
• 
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cost free to the farmer (i.e. the margin is covered by the 
government or the donors). 
3. Farm budget models CAviosl: The important issues here 
are whether the cost data and income data are accurate and up to 
date; whether the future income streams consider the probabilis-
tic risk of bad weather and poor harvests; and the degree to 
which more self-finance (than is currently practiced) is feasible 
in the present environment. Since the avios are widely used, 
their accuracy and reliability is an important issue. The 
assumption that farmer-investors are generally unable to engage 
in any meaningful level of self-finance is troublesome. This 
needs to be investigated more fully and a possible differential 
pricing scheme considered (to be discussed shortly). 
4. Transactions Costs: Several important issues emerge 
here. Why do farmers have to visit the office 4 to 5 times for 
an ordinary loan (and their cosigners on two occasions?). Why do 
established borrowers with a good repayment record have to fill 
out the same forms and go through the same procedures as a new 
borrower? Why do two separate loans (with their associated 
transactions costs) have to be issued in one year (one for 
planting, another for harvest expenses) instead of just one loan? 
Is it advisable to apply the 25 page BID package of application 
forms to all non-BID loans that currently use far less paperwork? 
What guarantee do we have that the BID portfolio performs better 
than the non-BID portfolio? In what way, if any, do the ad-
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ministrative procedures of the BID process ensure or contribute 
substantially to a well-performing portfolio, at least more so 
than the procedures currently used for the non-BID portfolio? 
Before applying the BID procedures elsewhere, it would be prudent 
to undertake an evaluation of cost effectiveness for the BID 
process itself. 
5. Arrears data management: It would be important to 
regularly and systematically disseminate intelligence data on the 
arrears in the Banco Nacional network, by enterprise type and by 
loan characteristics (term structure and loan size). With this 
information readily at hand, local branch managers can better 
evaluate the risks of local loans and higher level officials can 
pinpoint problem areas that deserve special attention and review. 
At the same time, bad debt (or poor credit rating) borrowers 
should be identified throughout the entire banking network. 
6. Consolidation and Decentralization: This issue comes 
to the forefront in the current plan for regional consolidation. 
What degree of decentralization (i.e. loan approval and rejec-
tion) should be allowed at the branch level? What degree should 
be passed onto the newly conceived ten regional units, with their 
broad-based infrastructure of technical assistance and financial 
analysis? One can appreciate the value of the scale and scope 
economies that can be gained at the regional level (particularly 
with respect to evaluating larger investment projects): however, 
• 
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local officials have the comparative advantage of knowing the 
client (and the creditworthiness) better and should be drawn into 
the decision-making process in an important way. One hopes that 
attempts at cost-reducing consolidation do not ignore these local 
inputs (particularly on ordinary loans). 
B. Pricing Issues 
The major issues here revolve around differential and 
variable interest rates and their possible link to self-financing 
strategies. 
1. Interest rate subsidies are not advisable for any 
length of time (if at all) • Why not reduce the level of the 
interest rate subsidy for the original client once the initial 
farming investment has been put in place? What possible jus-
tification could there be in continuing to offer interest rate 
subsidies for BID-financed or other longer-term finance once the 
initial infrastructure is in place? 
2. Similarly, why maintain interest subsidies on ordinary 
production loans? One would think it is self defeating to 
continue to offer these subsidies year after year to the same 
farmer for the same enterprise. If it is generating such a poor 
rate of return that some subsidy is needed, then the problem lies 
elsewhere, not in the terms of the credit contract. These 
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enterprises should not be financed if the root problems (outside 
the realm of credit) cannot be addressed or solved. 
3. Why not raise the interest rate for those who refuse to 
self finance any of their loan? Thus the highest interest rate 
would apply to those who receive 100 percent financing for their 
enterprise activity, with a gradual decline to lower levels for 
those who assume a greater role in self finance. 
4. Why not reduce the debt-equity ratio (i.e. increase 
self financing) for successive loans to the same borrower? 
5. It would be prudent to introduce a variable interest 
rate concept into the terms and conditions of longer-term loans 
to protect against the impact of future inflation on the real 
terms and conditions of the original loan. This could be done in 
several different ways. One could have fairly automatic adjust-
ments each quarter, semester or year, according to changes in the 
general price level or the price level of the major product being 
financed. Or, one could have discrete moments (say once a year) 
when the loan term could be renegotiated. Also, one could have a 
sliding threshold below which readjustment would not occur but 
above which either automatic or renegotiated settlements would 
occur. 
These variable interest rate adjustments would likely apply 
to the relatively better-off farmers comprising the BID-financed 
{ 
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portfolio or the commercial portfolio in the Banco Nacional. 
They would presumably be in a position to adjust to the new terms 
and conditions for their long-term loans, especially if the price 
index of the products being financed are used as a basis for 
readjustment. 
c. Conclusions 
In conclusion, the above mentioned organizational and 
pricing issues need to be addressed. In doing so, it should be 
remembered that the success of any cost-saving or risk-reducing 
reforms is intimately associated with the mind-set and ad-
ministrative bias established by higher authorities. The more 
that the authorities attempt to target lines of credit, heavily 
subsidize interest rates, remove all borrower self-finance, and 
introduce time-consuming administrative rules to minimize local 
level decision-making and responsibility, the greater the 
likelihood an unselective, arrears-prone portfolio will emerge 
through branch level operations. Any organizational reforms 
should recognize the positive contribution of institutional 
decentralization in portfolio selection, loan evaluation, and 
loan management decisions. 
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